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Nominal wage stickiness is an important component of recent medium-scale structural macroeconomic
models, but to date there has been little microeconomic evidence supporting the assumption of sluggish
nominal wage adjustment. We present evidence on the frequency of nominal wage adjustment using
data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) for the period 1996-1999. The SIPP
provides high-frequency information on wages, employment and demographic characteristics for a
large and representative sample of the US population.
The main results of the analysis are as follows. 1) After correcting for measurement error, wages appear
to be very sticky. In the average quarter, the probability that an individual will experience a nominal
wage change is between 5 and 18 percent, depending on the samples and assumptions used. 2) The
frequency of wage adjustment does not display significant seasonal patterns. 3) There is little heterogeneity
in the frequency of wage adjustment across industries and occupations. 4) The hazard of a nominal
wage change first increases and then decreases, with a peak at 12 months. 5) The probability of a wage
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It is dicult to explain the estimated real eects of monetary policy shocks without assuming that
some nominal variables adjust sluggishly. In the General Theory, Keynes (1936) assumed that
nominal wages were rigid, and thus that expansionary monetary policy would reduce real wages
and increase employment and output. Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1980) showed that nominal wage
contracts would have similar eects even in explicitly dynamic models with rational expectations.
Recent macro-econometric models have typically followed the important contribution of Erceg,
Henderson and Levin (2000), and assumed that both prices and nominal wages are slow to adjust.
The large number of recent models with such features has inspired researchers to examine micro
data on the frequency of price changes for individual products, with notable papers by Bils and
Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). However, to date there has been little research
using micro data to estimate the rigidity of nominal wages | even though Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (CEE 2005) nd that nominal wage rigidity is more important than nominal price
rigidity for explaining the dynamic eects of monetary policy shocks.
Our paper attempts to address this gap in the literature. The lack of previous work on the
business cycle implications of nominal wage rigidity using micro data may be due in part to a lack
of suitable datasets. We provide evidence about the frequency of wage adjustment in the United
States using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The SIPP is a
survey run by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). It provides individual wage histories for a
large and representative sample that is followed for a period of 24 to 48 months. Importantly,
the individuals are interviewed every four months. These data allow us to examine wage changes
using high-frequency data. (Most previous work on nominal wage rigidity using U.S. micro data
has used the PSID, which is an annual survey and thus less useful for high-frequency analysis.
Other well-known sources of micro wage data, the CPS and the Employment Cost Index (ECI), do
not provide suciently long time-series data on individual wages, and thus cannot be used for our
purpose.) We use the longest panel of the SIPP for which complete data are available: the 1996
panel (run from March 1996 to February 2000).
In our main results, we focus on the frequency of nominal wage adjustments disregarding em-
ployment history. This is arguably the concept that is most relevant for macro models with nominal
wage rigidities, particularly medium-scale DSGE models a la CEE (2005). The reason is that most
2business-cycle models with nominal wage rigidity follow Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and assume
that all workers are monopolistically competitive suppliers of dierentiated labor services. In this
framework, the worker sets the wage, and revises it occasionally on his/her own schedule, thus
making the sequence of wages regardless of employment history the relevant series to examine.
We use as our baseline the results for hourly workers (or wage earners) who reported their
hourly wages to the SIPP interviewer. The reason is that computing wages as hourly earnings
increases measurement error. For the baseline results we chose to focus on the statistic measured
with least error, the hourly wage, at the cost of making the sample less representative. However,
we also present results for the sample of salaried workers, using their monthly earnings as their
\wage" measure. By reporting the results for both hourly workers and for salaried workers, we
leave the decision of the \right number" for macroeconomics to individual researchers who may be
interested in calibrating their models using our estimates.
Regardless of the sample used, it is clear that the data are contaminated with a signicant
amount of measurement error. This is a disadvantage of working with data on individual wages,
which in U.S. survey data are always self-reported.1 We deal with this problem applying to the
reported wage and earnings series the correction for measurement error introduced by Gottschalk
(2005), who built upon the work of Bai and Perron (1998 and 2003). The application uses the
identifying assumption that wages are not adjusted continuously but are changed by a discrete
amount when an adjustment takes place, which corresponds to our usual intuition about labor
market institutions. The implied statistical model says that the true wage (or earnings) is constant
for an unspecied period of time and then changes discretely at unspecied breakpoints. Thus,
true wage changes in a noisy series can be estimated as one would estimate structural break dates
in a standard time series. The Bai-Perron-Gottschalk method is to test for a structural break at all
possible dates in a series. If one can reject the null hypothesis of no break for the most likely break
date, then assume that there is a break at that point in time. Then examine the remaining sub-
periods for evidence of structural breaks, and continue until one cannot reject the hypothesis of no
break for all remaining dates. The adjusted series have wage (earnings) changes at all dates where
we can reject the no-break hypothesis, and are constant otherwise. This is a systematic way of
excluding many instances of transitory wage changes that look very much like measurement error.
1Surveys in some other countries have access to administrative data from payroll or tax records, which reduces
measurement error signicantly.
3We present some examples in the paper where we apply this method to SIPP data for individuals
in our sample.
We nd the following main results. First, after correcting for measurement error, wages appear
to be very sticky. In our baseline result with hourly workers, we nd that the probability of a
wage change is about 18 percent per quarter, thus implying an expected duration of wage contracts
of 5.6 quarters. For salaried workers, the probability of an earnings change is only 5 percent per
quarter. By comparison, several key paper estimating DSGE models using macro data estimate this
probability to be about 30 percent per quarter, so we are nding signicantly more nominal wage
stickiness than macroeconomists typically assume. Second, the frequency of wage adjustment does
not display any signicant monthly or seasonal pattern. Third, we nd little heterogeneity in the
frequency of wage adjustment across industries. Wages in manufacturing appear to be more sticky
than wages in services. Similarly, we nd little heterogeneity across occupations, although the
frequency of wage adjustment is somewhat larger for service-related occupations. Fourth, we nd
that wage changes are signicantly right-skewed, in keeping with preceding papers (e.g., Gottschalk,
2005) that have found evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity in microdata. Fifth, the hazard
of a nominal wage change rst increases and then decreases, with a peak at 12 months. Thus, at
a micro level, the pattern of wage changes appears somewhat more in keeping with the staggered
contracting model of Taylor (1980) than the constant-hazard model of Calvo (1983). However, our
second result suggests that the timing of wage contracts is uniformly staggered throughout the year,
which is the pattern that gives maximum persistence of nominal wages following a shock. Sixth,
the probability of a wage change is positively correlated with the unemployment rate and with
the consumer price ination rate. Finally, we show that higher wage stickiness makes it easier for
macroeconomic models to match the stylized fact that monetary shocks cause persistent changes
in real output and small but relatively persistent changes in prices.
This paper is connected to several strands of the literature. The rst is the literature assessing
wage rigidity using micro data. Much of this previous literature has concentrated on the dierent
issue of downward nominal wage rigidity, rather than the frequency of wage adjustment per se. For
example, Kahn (1997) reports evidence of a substantial downward nominal wage exibility using
U.S. data from the PSID. Gottschalk (2005) analyses data from the SIPP and, after correcting
for measurement error, nds much greater downward wage rigidity. Lebow et al (1999) use the
4Employment Cost Index and also nd a substantial amount of downward wage rigidity. Dickens et
al (2007a) summarize the results coming from the International Wage Flexibility Project (IWFP).2
The IWFP has collected data on wages and analyzed wage dynamics using data from a large
number of countries. The main focus of this project is to perform analysis of wages dynamics that
are comparable across dierent countries.3 Perhaps unsurprisingly, one of the main ndings of the
project is that wage rigidity varies substantially across the dierent countries studied. This nding
suggests that one should be careful in extrapolating our results to dierent countries and perhaps
even to dierent time periods. Finally, in a very recent contribution, Heckel at al (2008) analyze
the frequency of wage adjustment for a large sample of French rms for the period 1998-2005.
Our paper is also related to the macro literature on nominal wage rigidity. Recent medium-scale
macroeconomic models have used the sticky-wage assumption extensively. Most of these models,
estimated through Bayesian techniques using aggregate data, suggest that nominal wages are quite
sticky. However, as recently pointed out by Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008), this approach to
estimation often delivers estimates that mirror the priors. In their conclusions, Del Negro and
Schorfheide advocate more empirical analysis of microdata, along the lines of the work by Bils and
Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) on the frequency of price adjustment.4 We
view our paper as a rst step towards providing similar micro estimates for wage dynamics.
A prominent strand of the literature on wage and employment dynamics over the business cycle
has focused on search and matching models of the labor market.5 Our paper is not directly related
to this line of work. First, these papers are formulated in purely real terms, so the relevant concept
is real wage rigidity, rather than the nominal rigidity we examine. Second, the search and matching
framework indicates that the issue that matters for macroeconomic purposes is whether a pre-set
wage paid to current employees is also applied to new hires.6 We estimate the wage stickiness
that matters in a monopolistically competitive labor market setting, which is the frequency of
wage changes for an individual regardless of employment history. Haefke et al (2008) and Hall and
Krueger (2008) examine micro evidence more related to the key predictions of the search literature.
2Other contributions are Dickens et al (2007b) and Druant et al (2008).
3The US was included among the countries studied for assessing downward wage rigidity but not among those
used to analyze wage stickiness. The reason, again, is that the IWFP data on US wages comes from the PSID which
provides only annual data.
4Although they warn that aggregation is a key issue when inferring macro behavior from micro evidence.
5For example, Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005).
6See Gertler and Trigari (2009).
5Finally, our results shed some light on a small but interesting literature on the seasonal eects
of monetary policy shocks. Recently, Olivei and Tenreyro (2008) have found that monetary policy
shocks that occur in the rst half of the year have larger real eects than those that occur later
in the year. They explain this result by positing a model where wage changes are more likely to
occur in the second half of the year. We nd that while the frequency of wage changes is indeed
slightly higher in the second half of the year, the magnitude of the dierence is much smaller than
assumed in the calibrated model of Olivei and Tenreyro, suggesting that a dierent model might
be needed to explain their very interesting empirical nding.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses the SIPP sample and the data
denitions that we use. Section 3 summarizes the methodology we use to correct the wage series for
unobserved measurement error. Section 4 contains the main results of the analysis obtained using
the sample of hourly workers, while section 5 presents the results for salaried workers. Section 6
explores the implications of the results obtained for the characteristics of a standard macroeconomic
model. Section 7 contains the discussion of the hazard estimates and section 8 concludes, and
suggests some directions for future research.
2 Data
The data source for this paper is the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The SIPP
data have been collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) since 1983, with a major revision
in 1996. The SIPP sample is a multi-stage, stratied, representative sample of the US population. A
large number of individuals are interviewed in order to collect detailed data regarding the source and
amount of their income, a variety of demographic characteristics, and their eligibility for dierent
federal programs. Each individual is followed for a period ranging from 24 to 48 months, with
interviews taking place every four months.
The SIPP has at least two advantages compared to the other two large surveys used for this kind
of analysis, namely the Outgoing Rotation Group data from linked Current Population Surveys,
and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. First, unlike the PSID, the SIPP provides us with high-
frequency information about wage changes. The near-quarterly frequency of the SIPP data makes
it much more relevant for analyzing business cycles. Second, unlike the ORG, where an individual
is interviewed for four consecutive months, not interviewed for the next eight months, and then
6interviewed for another four months before being dropped from the sample, the 1996 panel of the
SIPP, which we use, follows each individual for up to 48 months, thus creating the proper panel
data essential for our analysis.7 Finally, the SIPP reports more reliable information on wages and
hours than the ORG or the PSID. In both these surveys, respondents are asked about their income
only once a year, and must recall the amount and type of their income from various sources over
the preceding calendar year | a daunting prospect for most people. By contrast, in the SIPP
workers paid by the hour are asked specically for their hourly wage rate in each interview.
We focus on the longest panel of this survey for which complete data are available: the 1996
panel (run from March 1996 to February 2000). For each person in the panel, we have time series
information about their wage rate (if they get paid by the hour) and monthly earnings as well as
their industry and occupation. Table 1 reports basic descriptive statistics for our sample. The
1996 Panel follows 39,095 people, 49.4% of whom are women. We restrict our sample to workers
between 15 and 64 years of age. The average person in our sample is around 38 years old.
Our rst step aimed at minimizing measurement error is to focus on the smaller sample of those
people who directly reported their hourly wage to the SIPP interviewer (because they get paid by
the hour). Focusing only on hourly workers, however, has the drawback of reducing the size and
representativeness of the sample for the full population. Thus, we also report separately the results
for salaried workers. Of course, the latter do not report their wage rates. For salaried workers,
we use monthly earnings as opposed to hourly earnings. The reason is that using hourly earnings
would introduce much more noise into the wage history for salaried workers (since the earnings are
divided by the worker's recollection of hours worked, which is also likely to suer from measurement
error).
Our smaller sample of hourly workers includes 17,148 people. Table 1 gives basic descriptive
statistics of reported wages and earnings. The average wage rate in our sample for hourly workers
is $10.03 dollars. There is, however, a lot of heterogeneity. The 5th percentile of the distribution of
wages is $5 and the 95th is $20. The average monthly earnings for salaried workers is about $3,000
dollars. The 5th percentile of the distribution of earnings is $440 and the 95th is $6,800.
Tables 2 and 3 report the breakdowns for industry and occupational category at one digit level.
7In fact, the CPS is even less suitable than this summary indicates, because the sampling unit is the household
and not the individual. An individual leaving the housing unit is not followed; instead, new residents become survey
members.
7As Table 1 shows, Services is the most highly represented industry (33.3% of total hourly workers),
followed by Trade (26%) and Manufacturing (21%). Agriculture and Mining, on the other hand,
have very few observations. As for occupational categories, Technical Sales and Support is the most
highly represented in our sample (30%) followed by Machine Operators (24%) and Services (19%).
On the other hand, Professionals and Managers account for only 13% of the total in the hourly
workers sample, while they represent almost 30% of the entire survey. Not surprisingly, our smaller
sample under-represents occupational categories where workers are less likely to report receiving
hourly wages.
3 Method
A key to our results is trying to limit the impact of measurement error in assessing the frequency
of wage adjustment. Our rst way of achieving this objective is to reduce the sample to the people
who are hourly workers and reported their base wage rates to the SIPP interviewer. We prefer to
concentrate on the hourly wage, since earnings may vary at the same wage if people change their
hours worked. We also believe that people paid by the hour are likely to remember their hourly
wage rates, but few people recall their monthly earnings down to the last dollar.
A second step is to apply to the reported data the procedure introduced by Gottschalk (2005),
which is intended to purge the wage series of unobserved measurement error.8
The procedure relies upon the Bai and Perron (1998 and 2003) method to test for structural
breaks in the time series context. The key identifying assumption is that wage changes take place
in discrete steps. Assume that an individual works for T periods experiencing s wage changes
at time T1...Ts. The observed wage at time t, wt, is equal to a constant t plus the unobserved
measurement error t:
8We also apply this procedure to earnings. We apply the same procedure to the reported wage series for hourly
workers and to the reported earnings series for salaried workers. We refer only to wages in this section for expositional
simplicity.
8wt = 1 + t t = 1:::T1 (1)
= 2 + t t = T1:::T2
= :::
= s+1 + t t = Ts:::T
The objective is to estimate the s break dates and the s + 1 constant wages. The method
proposed by Bai and Perron proceeds sequentially. First, using the whole sample of T observations,
assume that there is one structural break, and pick the break date that minimizes the sum of
squared residuals (SSR). Then test to see if one can reject the null hypothesis of no break over the
entire sample against the alternative that there is a break at the point that minimizes the SSR.9 If
one cannot reject the null, then the procedure is nished, and concludes that there are no structural
breaks in the sample (i.e., the wage is constant over the whole sample). If one can reject, then
test for structural breaks in each of the sub-periods identied by the break test. Again, pick the
date that minimizes the SSR in each sub-period, and then test if a signicant break is detected
at that point. Continue until no signicant structural break is detected in any of the remaining
sub-intervals of data.
One might object that this procedure is biased towards nding wages that are sticky, since the
identifying assumption is that wages are set in nominal terms for a certain period of time! However,
we do not constrain the procedure to assume any minimum number of periods between true wage
changes. So, for instance, if an individual is followed for 48 months, corresponding to 12 interviews,
the procedure can detect up to 10 wage changes. 10 One might then ask whether the procedure
would be able to estimate a large number of breaks in a short time series. This is the important
issue of the power of the test, which we discuss at length below.
9Given the short time periods of the wage histories, the critical values for the structural break tests are obtained
through Monte Carlo simulations. The Appendix contains a more extensive explanation of the procedure adopted to
compute the correct critical values.
10Given that some people are observed for less than 48 months, we calculate a maximum quarterly frequency of
true wage changes potentially obtainable. For people interviewed 12 times, for example, such probability is 83%
(=10/12). Computing a weighted average of these probabilities across dierent numbers of interviews, we get a
maximum detectable quarterly probability of a true wage change of 56%, which is much higher than we actually
estimate
9Individual examples illustrate how this procedure works.11 Figure 1 shows the reported and the
adjusted wage series for \Linda," a 40-year-old secretary with high school degree. The reported
series12 shown by the dashed line, is characterized by ve wage increases and three wage decreases
over the period considered. By contrast, the adjusted series, shown by the solid line, shows only
two breaks, from $12.54 to $12.83 and from $12.83 to $13.56 (the last gure being the average of
the subsequent reported wages).
Figure 2 reports the distribution of the measurement error as implied by our correction proce-
dure. As the gure shows, the distribution of the measurement error appears symmetric, with a
big spike at zero.
Figure 3 shows the reported and the adjusted series for the hourly earnings of \Christina," a
40 year-old health care worker. Figure 3 highlights a potential problem with our methodology:
Low power of the test for structural breaks (especially in a short time series) might lead us to
underestimate the probability of a wage change. If people in our sample with true wage changes
have suciently noisy reported wages (because of measurement error), then our test might fail to
reject the null of no wage change.
Our application of trend-break tests to estimating the average frequency of wage changes raises
several statistical issues. We present an in-depth discussion of these issues and our solutions in the
appendix. Here we sketch an overview of this material.
The rst problem is that standard F-tests are not the appropriate method to test for a structural
break in wage series, for two conceptually dierent reasons. First, even in a setting where the error
term is i.i.d. and Gaussian, a standard F-test can only be used to test a hypothesis about a
structural change at a given date. By contrast, we perform tests for structural breaks at every
possible date and then test for a structural break at the date where such a break appears most
likely, and the distribution of this maximum F-statistic is dierent from a standard F distribution.
This problem was addressed by Bai and Perron (1998). Second, the error term is not i.i.d., because
the measurement error in wages is not a classical white noise error. In order to address this second
problem, we need to know the structure of the measurement error. Fortunately, Gottschalk and
Huynh (forthcoming) provide the required statistics. They compare reported SIPP wages with
wages for the same people in an administrative data set, where wages are based on tax records and
11We made up the names of the individuals in these examples.
12($12.53, $12.55, $12.53, $12.83,$12.83,$12.83, $13.5 $13.61 $13.4 $13.7 $13.61)
10thus measured essentially without error. The dierence between true and reported wages allows
them to estimate the measurement error process for the SIPP. Armed with this information, we
address the rst and second problems together via Monte Carlo simulations (microsimulations).
We simulate wage histories for individuals whose wages are constant in the simulations, but are
assumed to be observed with measurement error of the type found by Gottschalk and Huynh. Based
on these simulations, we calculate the critical value for the test of a structural break that will give
us the required size of the test (the probability of Type I error).
Following this procedure ensures that we have a consistent estimator of the break dates for
individual wage histories. However, just tabulating the frequency of these breaks does not give us
a consistent estimator of the frequency of nominal wage changes in the population. Again, there
are two reasons. The rst is the size of the test. Even if all wages were constant, the fact that
we pick the critical values to ensure a certain probability of Type I error means we would falsely
conclude that  percent of wages change each period, where  is the size of the test. By itself, this
force would lead us to conclude that wages are more exible than is really the case. But of course
there is also the issue of power | we do not necessarily detect every true break in the wage series.
Low power will lead us to make the opposite mistake, and conclude that wages are more sticky
than is really the case. We again address the issue of power and its implications for our estimated
wage change frequency via simulation. Using simulations where true wages change in the sample,
we can calculate the power of the test. Once the power of the test is known (of course, the size is
also known, as it is a parameter we specify), we can adjust the raw frequency count of estimated
breaks for both Type I and Type II error, and get a consistent estimate of the actual frequency of
nominal wage changes. (See the appendix for details.) It is the frequency adjusted for Type I and
Type II errors that we report in the next section.
4 Main Results
As noted in the introduction, we face the dicult task of mapping the large set of outcomes in micro
data into simple macro models. To guide our exercise, we stick as closely as possible to estimating
key parameters for the labor market institutions assumed in macro models with nominal wage
stickiness, although these institutions surely characterize only a subset of the rich heterogeneity
of employer-employee relationships present in our micro data. In macro models of this type, each
11worker is assumed to be a monopolistically competitive entrepreneur, supplying a unique variety of
labor and setting his or her own wage. An example is the behavior of an independent contractor,
such as a plumber or electrician, who charges according to a \rate sheet" specifying the wage
charged per hour. Such a worker may work at a number of dierent residences over the course
of a day, thus being paid by several dierent \employers" in quick succession and experiencing a
number of very short \employment spells." Or the contractor might work on a single, large project
for several weeks or even months, which would show up in the data as a long employment spell.
But the rigidity of the contractor's nominal wage depends on the frequency with which she or he
revises the rate sheet. In this framework, the right statistic to examine is the frequency of nominal
wage changes (rate sheet revisions) over the entire sample for which we have data, disregarding any
job transitions as irrelevant. For this reason, all the results presented in this section refer to the
entire wage history of each individual, regardless of his or her employment history.
While our data and analysis are at conducted with interviews taking place every four months,
we report the results at a quarterly frequency for ease of comparison with the previous literature.13
Table 4 reports the frequency of wage adjustment for hourly workers. The quarterly frequency of
wage adjustment for reported wages is very high. In the typical quarter for the 1996 panel, 48.1% of
people report a dierent wage than they reported in the previous interview. The situation changes
radically when considering the adjusted series for wages. In the 1996 panel, in the typical quarter
only 17.8% of hourly workers experience a change in their wage.
Under the assumption that the correction for measurement error is appropriate, we therefore
nd evidence of greater wage stickiness than previously found in estimated DSGE models using
aggregate data for the US economy. CEE (2005), for example, estimated the quarterly Calvo
probability of wage adjustment to be 36% in their benchmark model. In SW (2007) the benchmark
estimate of the same parameter is 26.2%. Our results are more consistent with the ndings of
Gottshalk (2005), who used the same method but analyzed a previous wave of SIPP data. Gottshalk
does not report exactly the parameter we estimate, but computing the analogous statistic from his
adjusted wage series gives a gure closer to ours (11%). The dierence can be partly explained by
the fact that Gottschalk analyzes a dierent time period (1986-1993), and that arguably the US
labor market became more exible over time. Finally, in a recent contribution, Heckel at al (HLM,
13We transform the results into quarterly results by multiplying by
3
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122008) found the average quarterly frequency of wage adjustment to be 35% for a large sample
of French rms. However, HML have access only to rm-occupation data, therefore they cannot
test the frequency of wage change at the individual level nor correct for measurement error in the
reported wages.14
We should note that macro estimates of the nominal wage parameter are not always estimated
to be around 0.30. In fact, CEE (2005) estimate variants of their baseline model, in two of which
(no habit formation, and low investment adjustment costs) the estimated degree of wage stickiness
is substantially higher, and close to our micro results. Perhaps future work on estimated DSGE
models should simply follow CEE's policy and use micro evidence like ours as a way of disciplining
macro estimates based on aggregate data.15
4.1 Seasonality
A second question we explore regards the seasonality of the pattern of wage adjustment. Olivei
and Tenreyro (2008) nd that monetary shocks have much larger eects on output if they occur
in the rst half of the year than if they occur in the last two quarters. They explain their ndings
by proposing a model where wage adjustment is seasonal, and is much more likely to take place
in the second half of the year. Their calibrated model assumes that 24% of annual wage changes
occur in the rst quarter, 2% in the second quarter, 32% in the third quarter, and 42% in the
fourth quarter. However, they explain that this calibration is based on a small sample of New
England rms because \there is no systematic empirical evidence pointing to particular values for
the [quarterly wage change frequencies]." We can supply this evidence using direct observation for
a representative sample of the US economy.
Figure 4 illustrates the frequency of wage adjustment by month. The frequency of wage ad-
justment for both the reported series and the adjusted series does not display the kind of sizable
seasonal pattern assumed in Olivei and Tenreyro's calibration.
In order to investigate more formally the seasonality in the frequency of wage adjustment, we
regress the probability of wage adjustment for both the reported and the adjusted wage series on
a set of quarterly dummies, where the excluded category is the frequency of wage changes in the
14Moreover, the mean wage in a rm-occupation cell can change even if there is no change in the wage for any
individual worker, if the composition of the individuals in the cell varies over time
15CEE (2005, p. 40) write \Our position is that a reasonable contract length is one that matches the duration of
contracts found in survey evidence. In this respect, we follow the empirical literature on wage and price frictions."
13rst quarter.
Table 5 reports the results . The F-test of joint signicance of the quarterly coecients always
rejects the hypothesis that they are all zero. The results qualitatively support the assumption that
drives Olivei and Tenreyro's model: Wage changes, do in fact, appear to be more likely in the
second half of the year, not at the beginning. However, the magnitude of the dierence is much
smaller than Olivei and Tenreyro's calibration assumes. In our data, the proportion of quarterly
wage changes relative to the total number of wage changes in a year is 23.6% in the rst quarter,
24.1% in the second quarter, 26.6% in the third quarter and 25.5% in the last quarter. Whether
these small dierences can explain the dierential seasonal eects of monetary policy shocks is an
open question, but we suspect that they cannot.16
Interestingly, Heckel et al (2008), using French rm-level data, nd evidence that the frequency
of wage adjustment is highly seasonal, with a spike in the third quarter. As the authors emphasize,
this nding might be due to a very specic institutional feature of the French labor market, where
by law the minimum wage is updated each year in July. However, there is no such feature in the
US labor market. Anecdotal evidence, in fact, suggests that in the US wage changes indeed take
place in January in some rms, but in other rms they occur at the hiring date of the worker. In
still other rms, wage changes are implemented at the beginning of the scal year.17
4.2 Heterogeneity
Our access to micro data allows us to explore whether wage stickiness diers across sectors or
occupations.
Table 6 reports the results from regressing the probability of a wage change for hourly workers
on a full set of industry dummies. The rst two columns report the probability of a wage change
obtained using respectively reported and adjusted wages. The third and the fourth column report
the dierences relative to the manufacturing industry. While in general the hypothesis of total
absence of heterogeneity is always rejected by the data, as shown by the p-value of the hypothesis
that all the coecients are zero, there is not much evidence of heterogeneity across industries in
the frequency of wage changes. Services, Trade and Transport and Communication displays lower
16See Dupor and Han (2009) for further discussion and a test of the hypothesis advanced by Olivei and Tenreyro
(2008).
17In some peculiar cases, the wage changes take place on the birthday of the company!
14level of wage skickiness than Manufacturing, while Construction, Mining and Agriculture do not
display signicantly dierent coecients.18
Table 7 repeats the exercise of Table 6, but now for dierent occupations. The coecients
in the third and fourth columns are relative to the production workers. Again, we nd only few
signicant results. One such result is that there is less wage stickiness in occupations related to
services and in managerial occupation.
The result of relatively little heterogeneity across industries and occupation might seem puzzling.
We explored whether this is an artifact of aggregation by exploring the data at the 2-digits level of
disaggregation (for both industries and occupations). While the point estimates display signicantly
more dispersion using the more rened classications, the very small number of observation available
for each category prevented us from nding dierences that are statistically signicant.19
4.3 Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity
In order to address a question typically asked by the labor literature on wage stickiness, we provide
some evidence on the importance of downward nominal wage rigidities. Figures 5 reports the
histogram of the non-zero adjusted wage changes. In order to avoid including outliers in the
calculations, we plot only the inner 98 percentiles of the distributions (that is to say we exclude the
lowest and the highest percentiles). As the graphs show, wage reductions are much less frequent
than wage increases. More precisely, they correspond to 11.5% of the non-zero wage changes. It is
important to remember that we are analyzing one of the highest-growth periods of the last several
decades, when nominal wage declines were probably less likely than in normal times.
Our results show that the period between 1996 and 1999 has been characterized by infrequent
nominal wage cuts, which is normally taken as evidence of \downward nominal wage rigidity" in
the literature. In our view, the term \rigidity" implies a friction, in this case a barrier to wages
tracking the value marginal product of labor. Many authors have advanced the hypothesis that
this barrier is stronger when the marginal product declines than when it rises. In our view, the
evidence that we have produced (like the similar evidence that has been oered elsewhere in the
literature) does not establish the existence of a rigidity in this sense. We think that a rigorous test
18But this is also partly due to the imprecision of these estimates that comes from the very small number of
observations for those industries.
19the results (not shown) are available upon request.
15of the hypothesis would require a model and further empirical work that would establish a baseline
for the expected shape of the distribution of wage. Absent such a baseline, we can establish that
nominal wage cuts are infrequent, but this nding does not have a structural interpretation.
4.4 Cyclicality
A fourth question of interest is the correlation between the frequency of wage adjustment for hourly
workers and some macroeconomic variables.
Figure 6 shows a scatter-plot of the cyclical components of the hp-ltered frequency of wage
adjustment and the realized monthly ination rate, computed as the percentage change of the
US CPI index for all goods and all cities. As the gure shows, the two variables are positively
correlated. The correlation between the two variables is 0.38 and is statistically signicant.
Figure 7 shows a scatter-plot of the cyclical components of the hp-ltered frequency of wage
adjustment against the monthly total US unemployment rate. The relationship between the two
variables is positive, with a correlation coecient of 0.28, but it is not statistically signicant .
In considering these results is important to realize that the answers we provide in this section
are based on an extremely short time-period (only four years of data), and hence must be considered
with great caution. Subject to this caveat, the evidence suggests that pure time-dependent models
of nominal wage rigidity, such as the models of Calvo and Taylor, cannot capture the whole story
of infrequent nominal wage changes. Nominal wage adjustments appear to also have a state-
dependent component. However, unlike the literature on nominal price rigidity, which has explored
state-dependent models of price changes, we are not aware of models of nominal wage rigidity that
are state- rather than time-dependent. Our results suggest that such models may be necessary. It
would be useful to redo an exercise like ours using data from periods where the ination and/or
unemployment rates were high, to see if the evidence of state-dependent wage changes is stronger
in such periods.
5 Salaried Workers
While we chose to present our baseline results using only the sample of hourly workers for whom
we have hourly wage data, here we also present estimates obtained using the sample of salaried
workers. In order to do that, we focus on monthly earnings (as opposed to hourly earnings) and we
16apply the same measurement error correction procedure to earnings that we used earlier for wages.
Table 8 reports the basic results for salaried workers. The average quarterly frequency of
earnings change is about 65%. The results we get with the adjusted series are much smaller, 4.9%.
In order to gain intuition about what might drive these extreme results, it is useful to illustrate
two examples.
Figure 8 shows the reported and adjusted series of monthly earnings for \Mark", a 42-year-old
manager at a business service rm. This example claries how our procedure is able to capture any
kind of change in earnings, provided that they are suciently large or persistent. Figure 8 report
instead the earnings history of \Peter", a 39-year-old mechanic. The reported series is very noisy,
with continuous ups and downs in the reported earnings. Given the procedure explained in section
three, the reader will not be surprised by seeing that in such a case the suggested adjusted earnings
prole is totally at. The predominance of reported earnings' histories similar to the one of Peter
is the likely cause of the results found in Table 8.
We repeat the same exercises we did for hourly workers on the sample of salaried workers.
Figure 10 shows how the frequency of earnings changes varies by calendar month. It is hard to see
any sizable seasonal eect. We investigate this hypothesis more formally, and Table 9 reports the
results. While we always reject the hypothesis that wage changes are uniform over the year, the
magnitudes of the dierences are always very small.
The result for heterogeneity across industries and occupations are reported in Tables 10 and 11.
While Service and Trade still exhibit higher wage exibility than Manufacturing, Transport and
Communication does not seem to have greater wage exibility than Manufacturing in the case of
salaried workers. On the other hand, for salaried workers the only occupation category that display
a signicant dierence from the production workers are the service workers, who display more wage
exibility.
Finally, correlating the frequency of earnings adjustment for salaried worker with macro vari-
ables, we conrm a positive relationship with the unemployment and ination rate, as in the case
of the hourly workers. The correlation with the monthly ination rate is slightly lower (0.34). The
correlation with the unemployment rate is 0.20 and it is not statistically signicant.
176 The Importance of Sticky Wages
We evaluate the signicance of our ndings for macroeconomics by using our parameter estimates
in a benchmark medium-scale macro model. We use the DSGE model proposed by Smets and
Wouters (2008; henceforth SW).20 We take the model exactly as presented in their article, and we
performed two simple exercises.
First, we estimate all the parameters of the model through Bayesian techniques after xing
the parameter for wage stickiness at 0.178 (our baseline result for hourly workers) and at 0.105.21
Second, we compute the impulse response functions produced by the model following a monetary
shock using both the parameter estimates of the original SW paper and the estimates we obtaine
from our rst exercise using data for hourly workers.
Table 12 reports the results obtained for some key parameters of the model. The rst column
reports the mode found in SW, the second column displays the posterior mode we nd after xing
the wage stickiness parameter to 0.178 and the third column what we get with 0.105. As the table
shows, the parameters related to price stickiness, price indexation and wage indexation do not dier
dramatically among the three cases. Also, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution appears to
change very little. Interestingly instead, the elasticity of labor supply increases a bit under our
specication, going from 1.92 to 2.28 to 2.60. Finally, the capital share in the production function
increases in our specication from the 0.19 obtained by SW to a more standard value of 0.3, which
is also more consistent with long-run evidence from national income shares.
In terms of the dynamic responses to shocks, Figure 11 reports the impulse responses to a
monetary policy shock. The solid line is the impulse response from the SW model using the
parameters reported in their paper, the long-dashed line reports the results from the model using
our parameter estimates for hourly workers, and the dot-dashed line the results obtained for the
totality of the workers. As expected we nd that with our estimates the model produces a larger and
more persistent response of output and consumption to a monetary shock. This is not particularly
surprising, since the micro data indicate that wage stickiness is higher than SW estimated based on
aggregate data, while our estimates of the other structural parameters are substantially unchanged.
The responses of hours do not dier dramatically, while the responses of the real wage and of price
20We use the code of the model that is available on the AER website
21Roughly the weighted average of the ndings obtained for hourly workers and salaried workers using the numbers
of workers as weights.
18ination appear to be damped and more persistent in our estimation.
Consistent with intuition, the ndings show that higher wage stickiness makes it easier for
macroeconomic models to match the stylized fact that monetary shocks cause persistent changes
in real output and small but relatively persistent changes in prices.
7 Hazard Functions
Thus far we have intentionally limited ourselves to computing a statistic that can be interpreted as
the constant hazard of a wage (earnings) change, which is also the statistic estimated in macroe-
conometric models. However, our data allow us to test whether the hazard is truly constant by
estimating hazard functions. The estimated hazards let us compare the t of Calvo-style models of
wage rigidity|which imply a constant hazard of experiencing a wage (earnings) change|vis a vis
other alternatives, such as contract renegotiations at xed intervals as in the Taylor (1980) model,
which would imply hazard functions that peak at certain durations.
To explore this issue we rst use the reported and the adjusted wage (earnings) series to estimate
a discrete-time hazard model, where an exit is dened as a change of the reported (or adjusted)
wage (or earnings)22. A new spell starts each time a new wage (or level of earnings) is observed, and
we include in the sample all non-left-censored spells. We control for age, gender and educational
attainment, and we include a full set of duration dummies. We use the estimated coecients on
the duration dummies to nd the hazard function for wage (earnings) changes.
Figure 12 shows the estimates of the hazard obtained using the reported wage series for the
hourly workers and the reported earnings series for salaried workers. The hazards are decreasing,
with more than half of the respondents experiencing a wage change in the rst four months. De-
clining hazards imply that the highest probability of having a wage change is immediately after
the previous wage change. This pattern is intuitively unreasonable, suggesting that there is indeed
signicant measurement error in the reported wage. Figure 13 reports the estimates of the hazard
obtained using the adjusted wage and earnings series. Here, by contrast, there is a clear peak at
12 months in both series.
We conclude that Taylor-type xed-length contracts have stronger empirical support than
Calvo-type constant-hazard models. However, the fact that the wage change frequency is almost
22see Box-Steensmeier and Jones (2004) p. 73.
19at over the calendar year (Figure 4 and Table 5) suggests that the starting time of the wage con-
tracts is uniformly staggered throughout the year. This pattern is, of course, the one that gives the
largest contract multiplier, and creates maximum persistence of the real eects of nominal shocks.
Although it gives the greatest persistence, uniform staggering is typically found to be an unstable
Nash equilibrium, so it is interesting that we are nding indirect evidence of staggered rather than
synchronized wage contracts.23
8 Conclusion
Since we already outlined the main results in the introduction, we conclude by suggesting directions
that future research might take.
First, it is important to understand why the stickiness estimated from micro data is greater
than the one estimated from aggregate data using Bayesian techniques. Idiosyncratic measurement
error, such a large concern in the analysis of micro data, is unlikely to be the explanation. Such
errors would average out, and contribute little to the variance of any aggregate wage series. One
possibility is that the dierence is due purely to aggregation issues: For example, if high-wage
workers' wages also adjust more frequently, then the aggregate wage will appear to more exible
than the average worker's wage. We plan to investigate this possibility using our data, but since
high-wage workers are likely to be salaried workers, whose adjusted earnings we nd to be more
sticky than the wages of hourly workers, this explanation appears unlikely. The reasons for this
micro-macro gap should shed light on the perplexing issues of aggregation that must concern all
macroeconomists interested in \structural" models.
Second, the lack of sizable seasonality in wage changes leaves an open question: What can
explain the estimated dierential eects of monetary shocks occurring in dierent quarters? Naka-
mura and Steinsson's (2008) nding that price adjustment is seasonal suggests one answer.24
Third, the ndings on the shape of the hazard functions suggest that we should explore the
properties of models based on xed-length wage contracts, as in Taylor (1980), in addition to the
23Our ndings are consistent with the empirical studies of Taylor (1983) and Cecchetti (1984), who found staggered
wage setting in union contracts. However, in the US labor market, very few workers are covered by formal union
contracts, so it is useful to extend their results to a representative sample of the US labor force. Some notable papers
show that in richer models staggering might be a stable Nash equilibrium after all. See, for example, Fethke and
Policano (1984), Ball and Cecchetti (1988) and Bhaskar (2002).
24Of course, Dupor and Han (2009) question the robustness of the nding itself.
20very tractable stochastic-length contracting models in the style of Calvo (1983).25
Fourth, our desire to estimate the key parameter of one particular macro-labor model led us
to focus on wage histories and disregard employment histories. However, the implication that
employment history is irrelevant is not shared by all macro models of the labor market. For
example, in the literature on search and matching in business cycle models, the wage stickiness
that matters for macro is the degree of (real) wage rigidity for new hires. We plan to explore
further these issues in future research.
Finally, from an epistemological point of view, we hope that this work will increase the awareness
that greater communication between economists working in dierent elds (in this case, macro and
labor economics) can produce valuable insights at relatively low cost.
25See for instance Knell (2010).
21A Technical Appendix
This appendix describes the methods we use to (1) obtain critical values to test for changes in wages
when the assumptions for the standard F test are not met, (2) estimate the power of these tests
and (3) obtain unbias estimates of the probability of a wage change by correcting for the impact
of type I and type II errors.
A.1 Critical values
Standard F test cannot be used to test for wage changes since the necessary assumptions for the
F tests are violated in two conceptually dierent ways. First measurement error in earnings is not
classical.26 The critical value must, therefore, be adjusted to take account of this violation of the
assumptions. Second, the test for structural breaks used in this paper is a test of the maximum
of a set of F statistics rather than the test of a single F statistic. Bai and Perron (1998) show
that the appropriate test for structural breaks must take into account that the test is based on
the maximum of l test statistics, where l is the length of the period being analyzed. The standard
critical values are no longer applicable since the critical value for the maximum of l test statistics
is higher the critical value for a single F statistic.
We address these problems by using Monte Carlo simulations that simulate data with the same
non-classical measurement structure found in the SIPP by Gottschalk and Huynh (forthcoming).
Their estimate of the structure of measurement error in the SIPP was obtained from SIPP earnings
records matched to uncapped W-2 earnings records in the Detailed Earnings Records (DER) le.
Measurement error is dened as the dierence between DER earnings and reported earnings in the
SIPP. These matched records are used to estimate the autocorrelation of measurement error (0.54)
and the signal-to-noise ratio (2.64).27
In order to obtain critical values to test the null hypothesis of no change in wages, we generate
2,000 wage proles of length l with no change in wages.28 We then apply the method described
in the paper to test for structural breaks in each of these constant wage series with measurement
error. The critical value for a test with a signicance level of  is obtained by calculating the F
value for each wage series, ranking these wage series on the basis of their F values, and nding the
critical F value where we falsely reject the null of no changes in wages  percent of the time. This
is repeated for simulated earnings series of length l = 3;4:::L
A.2 Power
We obtain the power of the test using a similar simulation procedure. In order to obtain the power
of the test we similarly generate 2,000 wage series of length l. But in this case each wage series has
26See the large literature reviewed in Bound and Mathiowetz (2001)
27Gottschalk and Huynh (forthcoming) also report a negative correlation between measurement error and DER
wages of -.339. Whether this mean reversion should be included in the analysis of individual wage proles depends
crucially on whether the negative correlation is between group (the expected value of measurement error is lower for
respondents with above average earnings) or within group (the expected value of measurement error declines when
an individual's wages rise). We assume the correlation is between group so mean reversion aects the mean but not
the variance of reported wages and has no impact on our estimate of the probability of wage change.
28Including multiple changes in wages over the l periods would not aect the estimates since the algorithm in the
rst iteration is based on the maximum F statistic over the full l periods, no matter how many wage changes are
found in further iterations.
22a permanent wage change of w after ~ l < l periods, where ~ l is randomly assigned. This is the true
wage series. The observed wage series has measurement error around this non-constant wage series.
The variance of the measurement error is set to be consistent with the signal to noise ratio found
by Gottschalk and Huynh (forthcoming). These wage series are used to calculate the proportion
of times our tests falsely fail to reject the null of no wage change, using the previously discussed
critical values. This yields the power of the test for a wage history of length l using a signicance
level of .
A.3 Adjustments to obtain consistent estimates
Estimating ; the probability that an individual will experience a wage change between waves,
requires an adjustment to ^  for Type I and II errors. We start by dening an indicator variable,
Iip(Wi;;jX); that takes the value 1 when the Bai and Perron (2003) algorithm nds a statisti-
cally signicant change in person i0s wages in period p; given the person's wage history, Wi; the
signicance level  used to test for breaks, and the power of this test, , given the number of
observations over which the maximum F is calculated.29.
The object of interest is the probability of a wage change across all persons and periods. Our














i is the total number of periods in i0s wage history. The numerator is the total number
of statistically signicant wage changes across the N histories, while the denominator is the total
number of periods across all histories.
The Bai-Perron algorithm provides a consistent estimate of Iip; the indicator of whether a wage
change has occurred in period p of person i0s wage history. However, this does not ensure that ^  is
a consistent estimator of , since the tests for wage changes are subject to both Type I and Type
II errors.




i tests for structural breaks. In expectation, P(1   ) of these
tests will be in periods where w = 0 . However, as a result of Type I error, P(1   ) of the
tested segments with no wage change will be falsely classied as having a statistically signicant
wage change. This error will lead us to over- estimate . On the other hand, Type II error (failing
to reject the null of no wage change when it is false), leads to an underestimate of . The expected
value of the number of wage changes that are falsely classied as having constant wages due to
sampling error is (1   )P, where  is the power of the test.30
The net impact of Type I and Type II errors is31
29The X vector includes observables that aect the critical value, such as the length of the period over which the
test is being carried out. X may also include variables of substantive interest, such as occupation or cyclical variables.
In practice we condition on these probabilities by including a set of dummies in descriptive logit estimates. These
include a set of dummies for the length of the period used to calculate the maximum F
30Power is dened as one minus the probability of a Type II error. Power depends on the signicance level of the
test for a wage change and the number of periods used in the estimation.
31This adjustment for Type I and Type II errors would seem to be applicable to a wider set of estimators in which
^  is function of a set of estimators ^ j(x) from a lower level of aggregation, j; each of which is subject to Type I and
Type II errors. Estimators using imputed values are one such example.
23plim(^ ) =
P(1   ) + P
P
(3)
= (1   ) +  (4)








Let ~  = ^  
( ); so ~  is a consistent estimator of the probability that a tested wage change is non-
zero. It can be computed by using our initial estimate of the probability of a wage change, ^ , the
signicance level used in these tests, , and the power of these tests, , that we obtain from the
microsimulations.
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27Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Total People (beginning) 39,095
Females 19,321
Hourly Workers (beginning) 17,148
Females 8,931
Mean Age 38
Mean Wage (Hourly Workers) 10.03
Mean Earnings (Salaried Workers) 2942
Table 2: Industry Composition of the Sample
Sample Total Total Hourly Hourly
Agriculture 778 1.99% 386 2.25%
Mining 174 0.45% 73 0.43%
Construction 1,993 5.10% 1,128 6.58%
Manufacturing 6,785 17.36% 3,684 21.48%
Transport and Communication 2,736 7.00% 1,093 6.37%
Trade 8,168 20.89% 4,459 26.00%
Services 15,881 40.62% 5,721 33.36%
Government and Public Administration 2,377 6.08% 597 3.48%
Army and Unemployed 203 0.52% 7 0.04%
Total 39,095 100% 17,148 100%
28Table 3: Occupational Composition of the Sample
Sample Total Total Hourly Hourly
Professional 5,660 14.48% 1,033 6.02%
Managerial 4,932 12.62% 638 3.72%
Technical Sales and Support 11,761 30.08% 5,109 29.79%
Craftsmen and production 4,048 10.35% 2,337 13.63%
Operatives 6,185 15.82% 4,239 24.72%
Service 5,504 14.08% 3,360 19.59%
Farming 807 2.06% 426 2.48%
Miscellaneous and Unemployed 198 0.51% 6 0.03%
Total 39,095 100% 17,148 100%
Table 4: Quarterly Frequency of Wage Adjustment, Hourly Workers






Table 5: Seasonality of the frequency of Wage Adjustment, Hourly Workers, Results
relative to the First Quarter
Type of Wages Reported Adjusted
Q 2 -0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Q 3 0.020*** 0.021***
(0.003) (0.003)




29Table 6: Heterogeneity in the Quarterly Frequency of Wage Adjustment, by Industry,
Hourly Workers (excluded category: Manufacturing)
Wages Reported Adjusted Reported Adjusted
Levels Levels Relative Relative
Agriculture 0.423*** 0.178*** -0.081*** 0.010
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Mining 0.482*** 0.148*** -0.022 -0.020
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Construction 0.456*** 0.174*** -0.048*** 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Manufacturing 0.504*** 0.168***
(0.002) (0.002)
Transport and Communication 0.501*** 0.186*** -0.003 0.018***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Trade 0.475*** 0.186*** -0.029*** 0.018***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Services 0.473*** 0.180*** -0.031*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Govt and Pub. Admin. 0.511*** 0.168*** 0.007 -0.000
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 136043 136043 136043 136043
SE in parenthesis. ***, **, * : Statistically signicant at 1%, 5% and 10%
30Table 7: Heterogeneity in the Quarterly Frequency of Wage Adjustment, by Occupa-
tion, Hourly Workers (excluded category: Production Workers)
Wages Reported Adjusted Reported Adjusted
Levels Levels Relative Relative
Professional 0.476*** 0.171*** -0.010** -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Managerial 0.455*** 0.186*** -0.031*** 0.014**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Technical Sales and Support 0.478*** 0.184*** -0.008** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Craftsmen and production 0.486*** 0.172***
(0.003) (0.003)
Operatives 0.494*** 0.174*** 0.008** 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Service 0.478*** 0.180*** -0.008** 0.008**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Farming 0.442*** 0.182*** -0.044*** 0.011
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 136043 136043 136043 136043
SE in parenthesis. ***, **, * : Statistically signicant at 1%, 5% and 10%
Table 8: Quarterly Frequency of Earnings Adjustment, Salaried Workers
Type Reported Adjusted
1996-1999 0.653 0.049
31Table 9: Seasonality of the Frequency of Earnings Adjustment, Salaried Workers, Re-
sults relative to the First Quarter
Type of Earnings Reported Adjusted
Q 2 -0.007*** 0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Q 3 0.012*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.001)




Table 10: Heterogeneity in the Quarterly Frequency of Earnings Adjustment, by In-
dustry, Salaried Workers (excluded category: Manufacturing)
Earnings Reported Adjusted Reported Adjusted
Levels Levels Relative Relative
Agriculture 0.622*** 0.050*** -0.036*** 0.003
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Mining 0.621*** 0.047*** -0.037*** -0.000
(0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
Construction 0.669*** 0.053*** 0.011*** 0.006***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Manufacturing 0.658*** 0.047***
(0.002) (0.001)
Transport and Communication 0.669*** 0.048*** 0.011*** 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Trade 0.665*** 0.050*** 0.007*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Services 0.645*** 0.051*** -0.012*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
Govt and Pub. Admin. 0.658*** 0.047*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 187694 185980 187694 185980
SE in parenthesis. ***, **, * : Statistically signicant at 1%, 5% and 10%
32Table 11: Heterogeneity in the Quarterly Frequency of Earnings Adjustment, by Oc-
cupation, Salaried Workers (excluded category: Production Workers)
Salaried Reported Adjusted Reported Adjusted
Levels Levels Relative Relative
Professional 0.637*** 0.050*** -0.032*** 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Managerial 0.639*** 0.048*** -0.030*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Technical Sales and Support 0.657*** 0.050*** -0.012*** 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Craftsmen and production 0.669*** 0.048***
(0.002) (0.001)
Operatives 0.684*** 0.048*** 0.015*** -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Service 0.673*** 0.052*** 0.004 0.004***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Farming 0.633*** 0.050*** -0.036*** 0.002
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003
N 187694 185980 187694 185980
SE in parenthesis. ***, **, * : Statistically signicant at 1%, 5% and 10%
Table 12: SW (2008) DSGE Model: Estimated Structural Parameter Values Fixing
Wage Stickiness (Selected Parameters, Posterior Mode)
SW Parameter Meaning SW Original BBG Hourly BBG Total
w Wage Stickiness 0.262 0.178 0.105
p Price Stickiness 0.66 0.66 0.69
w Wage Indexation 0.59 0.57 0.55
p Price Indexation 0.23 0.21 0.20
c EIS 1.40 1.37 1.40
l Elast. of Labor Supply 1.92 2.28 2.61
 Capital Share 0.19 0.30 0.30
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37Figure 9: Adjusted Wage Series, a Salaried Worker
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38Figure 11: Dynamic Response to a Monetary Shock, SW (2008) model, Dierent Levels
of Wage Stickiness
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